Thanks for the article, Ian. I greatly appreciate provocative theses, as they help to clarify critical points in debate and allow for better distinctions to be drawn. As for your argument, I ultimately think that your thesis about how to classify simulists et al. is wrong. The key distinction between classical theism and atheism to my mind depends upon answers to the following two questions: (1) whether there exists something which is a necessary/ungrounded, and (2) whether everything else depends upon this being. Classical theists answer both questions in the affirmative. On this view, the only thing which can meaningfully count as God thus is a necessary/ungrounded being on which all other beings depend. By definition, the various 'creators' which are nested Russian-doll-like according to the "simulist" hypothesis fail to meet this criterion.
I think the main issue is that the "simulist" hypothesis aims to reduce the 'creator' figure to something whose properties are strictly physical (whatever one takes "physical" to entail).
This being said, you are indeed right to highlight a unique opportunity. These various pop-sci views present an opening for Christians to discuss classical issues of metaphysics, cosmology, and meaning.
Thank you Nick! Would you also say that historical / world religions that lack any real conception of classical theism - Egyptian, classical, Norse, and some other polytheistic pantheons seem like some of the more obvious examples - are atheist or nontheist?
The very term “classical theism,” after all, seems to suggest that it is some subset of theism. And then of course there is the word “polytheism” itself.
That is a very good question. I would tend to classify those religions as being pagan rather than theistic. This tendency, I hasten to add, is due to my understanding of the term, “theism.” This is certainly a matter of historical circumstance, but “theism” (as I understand it) is now standardly used to describe worldviews which identify god with the most basic or fundamental reality described by the categories of (Greek) metaphysics. So I think that “theism” and “religion” are not equivalent terms. Perhaps theism is a subset of religion, namely, being religion that identifies the deity with the fundamental reality, as defined in metaphysical terms. (This being said, it seems that there is a uniquely modern phenomenon whereby philosophers, who either have left organized religion or had never been a part of it, have been lead to accept a theistic understanding of the world, though they do not describe themselves as being religious. Antony Flew comes to mind. So these categories and their relations are not hard-and-fast. This being said, the example of a Flew seems to underscore the point that the essential core to the term, “theism”, is in fact the metaphysical commitment which the simulists reject.) If I am right about the meaning of the term, “theism,” it would mean that “theism” and “polytheism” are not necessarily subsets of the same general class. Polytheists do not always identify the gods with the most basic reality. (One might argue that this consequence of my definition would amount to a reductio against it, but I disagree.)
One might think instead that we should categorize “simulism” as a religion, but for a variety of other reasons that move also seems wrong to me. Thus, I think your categorization of it as a cosmogony of sorts is best.
Stimulating reading, Ian. It does seem to me that we are still very far from the pure transcendence of traditional philosophy and religion, whether Brahman, Plotinus' "One," or Aristotle's "Thought Thinking Itself." Even religiously inclined moderns have an insufficient grasp of the reality of immaterial things; something that continually puzzles me when I consider the implications mathematics has for the possibility of immaterial being, let alone something like consciousness.
Thank you, Michael. Relevant to your point: Steinhart argues that—assuming there is an infinite series of simulated universes—that series would itself be contingent, being composed of contingent things, and so require a necessary foundation to explain it.
Thanks for the article, Ian. I greatly appreciate provocative theses, as they help to clarify critical points in debate and allow for better distinctions to be drawn. As for your argument, I ultimately think that your thesis about how to classify simulists et al. is wrong. The key distinction between classical theism and atheism to my mind depends upon answers to the following two questions: (1) whether there exists something which is a necessary/ungrounded, and (2) whether everything else depends upon this being. Classical theists answer both questions in the affirmative. On this view, the only thing which can meaningfully count as God thus is a necessary/ungrounded being on which all other beings depend. By definition, the various 'creators' which are nested Russian-doll-like according to the "simulist" hypothesis fail to meet this criterion.
I think the main issue is that the "simulist" hypothesis aims to reduce the 'creator' figure to something whose properties are strictly physical (whatever one takes "physical" to entail).
This being said, you are indeed right to highlight a unique opportunity. These various pop-sci views present an opening for Christians to discuss classical issues of metaphysics, cosmology, and meaning.
Thank you Nick! Would you also say that historical / world religions that lack any real conception of classical theism - Egyptian, classical, Norse, and some other polytheistic pantheons seem like some of the more obvious examples - are atheist or nontheist?
The very term “classical theism,” after all, seems to suggest that it is some subset of theism. And then of course there is the word “polytheism” itself.
That is a very good question. I would tend to classify those religions as being pagan rather than theistic. This tendency, I hasten to add, is due to my understanding of the term, “theism.” This is certainly a matter of historical circumstance, but “theism” (as I understand it) is now standardly used to describe worldviews which identify god with the most basic or fundamental reality described by the categories of (Greek) metaphysics. So I think that “theism” and “religion” are not equivalent terms. Perhaps theism is a subset of religion, namely, being religion that identifies the deity with the fundamental reality, as defined in metaphysical terms. (This being said, it seems that there is a uniquely modern phenomenon whereby philosophers, who either have left organized religion or had never been a part of it, have been lead to accept a theistic understanding of the world, though they do not describe themselves as being religious. Antony Flew comes to mind. So these categories and their relations are not hard-and-fast. This being said, the example of a Flew seems to underscore the point that the essential core to the term, “theism”, is in fact the metaphysical commitment which the simulists reject.) If I am right about the meaning of the term, “theism,” it would mean that “theism” and “polytheism” are not necessarily subsets of the same general class. Polytheists do not always identify the gods with the most basic reality. (One might argue that this consequence of my definition would amount to a reductio against it, but I disagree.)
One might think instead that we should categorize “simulism” as a religion, but for a variety of other reasons that move also seems wrong to me. Thus, I think your categorization of it as a cosmogony of sorts is best.
Stimulating reading, Ian. It does seem to me that we are still very far from the pure transcendence of traditional philosophy and religion, whether Brahman, Plotinus' "One," or Aristotle's "Thought Thinking Itself." Even religiously inclined moderns have an insufficient grasp of the reality of immaterial things; something that continually puzzles me when I consider the implications mathematics has for the possibility of immaterial being, let alone something like consciousness.
A good read.
Thank you, Michael. Relevant to your point: Steinhart argues that—assuming there is an infinite series of simulated universes—that series would itself be contingent, being composed of contingent things, and so require a necessary foundation to explain it.
It does rather take one back to ST Prima Pars Q. 2, doesn't it?
By "we" I mean the new silicon cosmogonists.